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ABSTRACT 
It has been widely recognized that ownership structure has an impact on firm performance. This 
paper examines whether rural banks owned by government have poorer performance than those 
owned by private parties with the emphasis on corporate governance uniqueness of state-owned 
rural banks. 42 rural banks in Indonesia has been selected as the sample. MANOVA test is used 
to investigate the difference performance between the two types of the rural banks. The results 
show that state-owned rural banks perform poorer than their privately-owned counterparts. It is 
indicated by lower ROA ratio and higher OEOI and NPL ratios. The important implication of this 
finding suggets that government ownership impede boards of rural banks to implement good 
corporate governance practices in order to improve their banks performance.   
 
Keywords: ownership types, corporate governance, regulations, state-owned rural banks, 
performance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been widely recognized that 
ownership structure has an impact on firm 
performance. Pioneered by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) through their well known 
agency theory, it is described that a firm is a 
relationship between a principal (the owner 
who delegates work) and an agent (who 
manages the firm). Such a relationship results 
in two major problems for the firm. Firstly, a 
problem appears due to the different 
objective between the principal and the agent. 
Secondly, risk sharing between both parties 
as a consequence of distinct attitude towards 
such risks (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, 
boards are required to monitor management 
to run the firm operations to ensure that the 
firm objective is aligned with the best interest 
of the owner (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
In practice, the owners of a firm 
consist of individuals (including families) 
and institutions (firms and government), and 
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some are concentrated and others are 
dispersed. In banking, types of ownership 
structure can be referred to foreign-owned 
banks, private domestically owned banks and 
state-owned banks (Berger et al, 2005). They 
find that state-owned banks have poor long-
term performance (static effect), those 
undergoing privatization had particularly 
poor performance beforehand (selection 
effect), and these banks dramatically 
improved following privatization (dynamic 
effect), although much of the measured 
improvement is likely due to placing 
nonperforming loans into residual entities, 
leaving ‘‘good’’ privatized banks. Cornett et 
al (2010) also suggest that state-owned banks 
are characterized among other by low profit, 
low core capital and greater credit risk, 
especially in countries with greater 
government involvement and political 
corruption in the banking system. A research 
carried out by La Porta et al (2002) on 
government ownership of banks also 
indicates that slower subsequent financial 
development and lower economic growth in 
1970 were triggered by higher state 
ownership of banks. Kim and Rasiah (2010) 
also reveal that in Malaysia there is a positive 
and significant association between the 
corporate governance and bank performance, 
and there is also a positive and significant 
foreign ownership and government-
connected ownership variables as well as 
governance variables with different bank 
performance measures in foreign-owned 
banks and private domestically owned banks. 
Moreover, a research conducted by Huang 
(2010) indicates that there is a positive 
association between family-owned shares 
and commercial banks performance in 
Taiwan. Meanwhile, Iannotta et al. (2006) 
find that mutual banks and government-
owned banks perform a lower profitability 
than privately-owned banks, despite their 
lower costs. Micco et al. (2004) also reveal 
that state-owned banks operating in 
developing countries indicate lower 
profitability and higher costs than their 
private counterparts; in contrast, ownership is 
not correlated with performance in industrial 
countries. In relation to bank lending 
behavior, Sapienza (2004) finds that the 
lending behavior of state-owned banks is 
influenced by the electoral results of the party 
affiliated with the bank. In other words, state-
owned banks charge lower interest rate to the 
winning party-affiliated firms (mostly firms 
which are large and located in depressed 
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areas) than do privately-owned banks. Rather 
similar issue is also revealed by Dinc (2005) 
that state-owned banks expand lending 
during election years compared to private 
banks which is about 11% of their total loan 
portfolio. 
Nonetheless, studies on the impact of 
the ownership structure on rural banks 
performance seem to be scanty and the 
emphasis of the previous studies is also 
different. Hein et al (2005) define rural banks 
as banks which focus their activities on local 
communities, gathering deposits, lending 
within a restricted trade area and have less 
than USD1 billion in assets. Furthermore, 
they mention several uniqueness of the 
community banks compared to larger banks. 
Amongst the uniqueness are that the banks 
emphasize their activities on human-aided 
transactions on lending and deposit side (or 
focus more on relationship banking than 
transactional banking), the source of income 
are higher from the interest than noninterest, 
and their ownership is more concentrated in 
fewer shareholders and the owners are more 
actively involved in managing the banks. A 
study by Lerin (2009) on rural banks in the 
Philippines shows some characteristics that 
most of them comply with corporate 
governance mechanisms (in terms of board 
chairman’s and board member’s 
responsibilities, board committess and issues 
guidelines), have few branches and about 6 – 
15 employees in each branch. Meanwhile, 
Ibrahim (2010) who studied rural banks in 
India reveals that performance of rural banks 
in India has significantly improved after 
amalgamation process which has been 
initiated by the Government of India.    
With regard to regulatory issues on 
banks in general, several researchers have 
also different results. Mullineux (2006) 
suggests that regulations are required to 
establish the good corporate governance of 
banks in order to balance the interests of 
depositors and taxpayers with those of the 
shareholders. Barth et al (2004) also argue 
that several guidelines in policies (force 
accurate information disclosure, empower 
private-sector corporate control of banks, and 
foster incentives for private agents to exert 
corporate control) are recommended to 
promote bank development, performance and 
stability. Another study conducted by 
Chortareas et al (2011) also find some 
interesting issues on bank efficiency that (1) 
improved operation efficiency of banks is 
strengthened by capital restrictions and 
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official supervisory powers, (2) higher bank 
inefficiency levels are the outcome of 
interventionist supervisory and regulatory 
policies such as private sector monitoring and 
restricting bank activities, and (3) bank 
efficiency are more pronounced in countries 
with higher quality institutions as the 
beneficial effects of capital restrictions and 
official supervisory powers (interventionist 
supervisory and regulatory policies). 
Furthermore, Pasiouras et al (2009) argue 
that banking regulations increase cost and 
profit efficiency of banks, however, 
restrictions on bank activities reduce cost 
efficiency but improve profit efficiency.  
In Indonesia, ownership structure of 
rural banks is not much different from that of 
commercial banks. They are owned by 
government (in this case by local 
government) and private parties (individuals, 
families or institutions). In general, from a 
regulatory point of view, the banks comply 
with the banking authority (Bank of 
Indonesia) regulations. Nevertheless, the 
ownership types have also a practical 
consequence on corporate governance 
implementation of the banks since the banks 
should comply with one of two different 
regulations. As for privately-owned rural 
banks, they should comply with companies 
act, whereas for their state-owned 
counterparts it is anchored in local 
government regulations. For privately-owned 
banks day-to-day business operations, the 
compliance with the companies act has been 
a common situation since other private 
nonbank companies also do the same. On the 
contrary, state-owned rural banks should 
comply with local government regulations, 
not the companies act which lead them to 
have unique characteristics in their corporate 
governance practices (the uniqueness is 
relatively different from those as indicated by 
Hein (2005) as explained above). In practice, 
such uniqueness widely affect their 
performance.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Uniqueness Of State-Owned Rural 
Banks 
In Indonesia, one of general 
guidelines for rural banks to run their 
businesses is regulated under Bank Indonesia 
Regulation No.8/26/PBI/2006 concerning 
Rural Banks. This regulation also stipulates 
such issues on corporate governance as 
ownerships, board of directors and 
supervisory board. Nevertheless, other 
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regulations pertaining corporate governance 
that rural banks should also comply with are 
(i) companies act for privately-owned rural 
banks (which should commonly either 
publicly- or privately-owned firms abide by 
as well), and (ii) Minister of Local Affairs, 
local government and governor’s regulations 
for state-owned rural banks, and to some 
extent, issues on such local government 
regulations should also be aligned with 
central government regulations, especially 
those related to procurements.  
As previously mentioned on the 
uniqueness issues raised by Hein et al (2005), 
in this study, such issues are more 
specifically focused on the uniqueness of 
corporate governance of state-owned rural 
banks. The term “state-owned” in this 
research refers to the ownership of local 
government. The most important thing to 
underline here is that the uniqueness appears 
due to regulations the state-owned rural 
banks should abide by and it is a common 
situation for those banks operating 
throughout the country. On the contrary, the 
privately-owned rural banks compliance with 
merely Bank Indonesia regulations shows no 
particular corporate governance uniqueness. 
In practice, such corporate governance 
uniqueness has relatively wide effects on the 
state-owned rural banks in its association 
with the efforts of improving their 
performance. Based on some several local 
government regulations, among 
characteristics identified as the corporate 
governance uniqueness of those rural banks 
are as follows: 
First, the rural banks are owned either 
by both provincial and municipal/regency 
government, or by municipal/regency 
government only. When the banks are owned 
by both government, the ownership 
composition comprises 51% shares of 
provincial government and 49% shares of 
municipal/regency government. Second, 
employees and organization are regulated as 
follows: (i) for rural banks owned by both 
government, organization structures and 
general guidelines on employees are 
determined under the governor’s decree, and 
employee procurements are carried out by the 
board of directors with the recommendations 
of the supervisory board and the approval of 
the general meeting, and (ii) placement, 
appointment and dismissal of employees are 
determined by board of directors with the 
approval of supervisory board; in case of 
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disagreement, the general meeting will take 
them over.  
Third, supervisory board members 
are bureaucrats (representatives) of the local 
government, however, they can be appointed 
from professional and independent third 
parties. In relation to its type of ownership as 
explained above, for rural banks owned by 
both provincial and municipal government, 
the administrators appointed to the 
supervisory board should be the 
representative of the government, 
respectively. However, for those owned by 
municipal government only, the individuals 
assigned for the occupation are completely 
from its administrators. Meanwhile, 
members of the board of directors of state-
owned rural banks can be either the 
combination of professionals and promoted 
employees, entirely professionals, or 
completely promoted employees. The 
appointment and issues related to tasks and 
responsibilities of the board of directors 
stipulated in the local government regulations 
refer to Bank Indonesia regulations. 
Fourth, members of the board of 
directors who were previously the banks 
employees can be reemployed to fill middle 
management positions at the banks, such as 
division heads and internal control officers, 
as long as they have not been qualified in the 
retirement policy. To some extent, the retired 
board members can also be appointed to be 
the board members of other state-owned rural 
banks in the region.  
Fifth, the banks are injected with 
capital by the local government every year 
after local development budget is approved 
by the local house of representatives. Such a 
practice refers to a common mechanism in 
governmental budgetary system in Indonesia 
that profitable state-owned companies pay 
dividends to the state cash and then the state 
will reallocate them to the state-owned firms. 
Through such a procedure, state-owned rural 
banks commonly have higher capital amount 
(but not consequently higher capital 
adequacy ratio due to high nonperforming 
loans) than privately-owned banks. The 
proposed hypothesis (null hypothesis) is that 
the corporate governance uniqueness of state-
owned rural banks deterioriate their 
performance compared to those of privately-
owned banks. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
To analyze the impact of the 
corporate governance uniqueness of the state-
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owned rural banks on their financial 
performance, a test is carried out by using the 
following procedures. First, sample are all 
rural banks operated in Indonesia during the 
period 2007 – 2012. Those samples are 
obtained from Bank of Indonesia (the central 
bank of Indonesia). It is started from 
December 2007 due to the the technical issue 
of avalibilaty. Moreover, to make possible of 
capturing relatively complete movements of 
the banks performance, data are 
demonstrated on quarterly basis. Second, 
performance indicators consist of return on 
assets ratio (ROA, or gross income divided 
by average total assets), operational expense 
to operational income ratio (OEOI) and non 
performing loans ratio (NPL, or unqualified 
loans of substandard, doubtful and loss 
divided by total loans)1. The reasons of using 
such variables can be explained as follows:  
First, ROA ratio describes the ability of the 
bank productive assets (for those rural banks 
commonly contain loans and placement to 
other banks) to generate income. The higher 
the ratio, the better the bank productive assets 
contribute to the bank performance. Second, 
                                                          
1 The complete components of five-tier loan 
classifications based on the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) are pass, special mention, 
substandard, doubtful and loss. Nevertheless, for rural 
OEOI ratio shows the efficiency level of the 
banks. The lower the ratio, the better the 
efficiency level of the bank operations. Third, 
NPL ratio illustrates prudent principles in 
managing risks, particularly credit risk, since 
most of the bank asset portfolios are loans. 
The lower the ratio, the better the the quality 
of the bank loans, then the lower the credit 
risk faced by the banks which in turn 
impacting on a better performance of the 
banks. Then, data was examined by using 
multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) to compare financial 
performance between state-owned and 
privately-owned rural banks (distinction 
test). Why MANOVA? Because, as 
previously mentioned, dependent variables 
consist of more than one variable which are 
ROA, OIOE and NPL, and independent 
variables comprise two types of ownership 
which are local government and private 
individuals or institutions.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics  of variables. In general, results 
banks in Indonesia, such classifications exclude 
special mention loans.   
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indicate that there are differences in 
performance between state-owned rural 
banks and privately-owned rural banks based 
on ROA, OEOI and NPL ratios. For state-
owned rural banks, average ROA ratio is 
lower than that of privately-owned rural 
banks, or 2.95% compared to 3.54%. It 
means that state-owned rural banks 
productive assets have lower ability to 
generate income than those of privately-
owned counterpart owned rural banks. 
Meanwhile, average OEOI ratio of state-
owned rural banks is 81.65%, whereas the 
same ratio for their privately-owned 
counterparts is relatively lower, or 79.94%. It 
indicates that the efficiency level of state-
owned rural banks is relatively lower than 
that of their Furthermore, average NPL ratio 
of state-owned rural banks is much higher 
than that of private-ly owned rural banks, or 
9.71% compared with 5.86%. It shows that 
credit risk faced by state-owned rural banks 
is higher than that of privately-rural banks. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Ownership Types Mean Std. Deviation N 
ROA-State-owned 2.9476 .51456 21 
ROA-Privately-owned 3.5367 .53066 21 
Total 3.2421 .59614 42 
OEOI-State-owned 81.645 2.0522 21 
OEOI-Privately-owned 79.944 2.7359 21 
Total 80.795 2.5391 42 
NPL-State-owned 9.71 1.627 21 
NPL-Privately-owned 5.86 1.243 21 
Total 7.79 2.417 42 
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Table 2. The Results of MANOVA Test 
 
Effect Value F DF Sig 
Intercept 
Pillai's Trace 1.000 153801.671b 3.000 .000 
 Wilks' Lambda .000 153801.671b 3.000 .000 
 Hotelling's Trace 12142.237 153801.671b 3.000 .000 
 Roy's Largest Root 12142.237 153801.671b 3.000 .000 
Ownership Pillai's Trace .775 43.667b 3.000 .000 
 Wilks' Lambda .225 43.667b 3.000 .000 
 Hotelling's Trace 3.447 43.667b 3.000 .000 
 
Roy's Largest Root 3.447 43.667b 3.000 .000 
 
In the meantime, Box’s Test reveals Box’s M 
value of 30.117 and F-test is relatively robust 
with significance level of 0.000 (lower than 
5%). It means that variance/covariance matrix 
of dependent variables (ROA, OEOI and NPL) 
is different. As a consequence, null hypothesis 
which stipulates that variance/covariance 
matrix is similar is rejected. Although such a 
result is in contrast to MANOVA assumption, 
the analysis can be proceeded. Furthermore, to 
check whether the ownership types affect the 
dependent variable group, the result can be 
observed from the Wilk’s Lambda value (this 
parameter is used to measure the effect of 
independent variables on more than two 
dependent variables). It shows that F-test value 
for Wilk’s Lambda is 43.667 with a 
significance level of 0.000. It suggests that a 
relationship between the ownership types and 
the rural banks performance exists. Levene’s 
Test also indicates that the three dependent 
variables are significance at 5% level implying 
that those variables have similar variance and 
that is aligned with MANOVA asumption. 
Table 2 exhibit the results of MANOVA test. 
Finally, the result of Test of Between-
Subjects Effects (Table 3) which examines the 
effect of ANOVA univariate of each factor (the 
ownership type) on dependent variables 
reveals that F-test value for those dependent 
variables is significance at 5% level. It suggests 
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that the distinction of the ownership type has 
an impact on performance divergence between 
state-owned rural banks and privately-owned 
rural banks. Nevertheless, among the three 
performance indicators, only NPL ratio is 
significantly affected by the ownership type 
differences. It is indicated by the Adjusted R 
Squared of 64.1%, while the same values of 
those for ROA and OEOI ratios are much lower 
of 23.1% and 9.3%, respectively. In other 
words, the effect of ownership types is 
relatively substantial on the deterioration of 
NPL performance. On the contrary, other 
factors than the ownership types probably play 
a considerable influence on ROA and OEOI. 
Based on such results, it can be suggested that 
local government ownership and corporate 
governance uniqueness result in poor 
performance for state-owned rural banks.  
 
Table 3. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Dependent 
Variable 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Noncent 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerd 
 
Corrected 
Model 
ROA 
OEOI 
NPL 
3.643a 
30.396b 
155.713c 
1 
1 
1 
3.643a 
30.396b 
155.713c 
13.336 
5.197 
74.322 
.001 
.028 
.000 
13.336 
5.197 
74.322 
.946 
.604 
1.000 
Intercept ROA 
OEOI 
NPL 
441.483 
274165.713 
2545.461 
1 
1 
1 
441.483 
274165.713 
2545.461 
1616.050 
46879.794 
1214.948 
.000 
.000 
.000 
1616.050 
46879.794 
1214.948 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
Ownership 
type 
ROA 
OEOI 
NPL 
3.643 
30.396 
155.713 
1 
1 
1 
3.463 
30.396 
155.713 
13.336 
5.197 
74.322 
.001 
.028 
.000 
13.336 
5.197 
74.322 
.946 
.604 
1.000 
Error ROA 
OEOI 
NPL 
10.927 
233.931 
83.805 
40 
40 
40 
.273 
5.848 
2.095 
    
Total ROA 
OEOI 
NPL 
456.053 
274430.040 
2784.979 
42 
42 
42 
     
Corrected 
Total 
ROA 
OEOI 
NPL 
14.571 
264.327 
239.518 
41 
41 
41 
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Table 4.  Independent Sample t-test 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
OWNERSHIP 
TYPES 
Mean Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
ROA State-owned 
Privately-owned 
2.948 
3.537 
.114 
.114 
2.717 
3.306 
3.178 
3.767 
OEOI State-owned 
Privately-owned 
81.645 
79.944 
.528 
.528 
80.579 
78.877 
82.712 
81.010 
NPL State-owned 
Privately-owned 
9.710 
5.860 
.316 
.316 
9.072 
5.221 
10.349 
6.498 
 
Based on the above findings, it is 
obvious that distinctions in ownership types 
affect rural banks performance. For state-
owned rural banks in particular, the 
ownership type also emerge some uniqueness 
in their governance characteristics which 
influence their boards in dealing with the 
business operations. Thus, those results 
support previous research findings that state-
owned rural banks have relatively poor 
performance than their private counterparts 
(Cornett et al, 2010; Micco et al., 2004). In 
terms of bank efficiency, such results also 
support the conclusions of Chortareas et al 
(2011) that higher bank inefficiency levels 
are the outcome of interventionist 
supervisory and regulatory policies. With 
regard to the results, some implications 
emerge at regulatory and practical levels. 
At regulatory level, local government 
regulations tend to inhibit boards of state-
owned rural banks to implement good 
corporate governance practices to their 
banks. As a consequence, this leads the banks 
to have relatively poorer performance than 
privately-owned rural banks. Thus, local 
government should consider that state-owned 
rural banks are entities which have different 
objectives from local government 
institutions. They are undoubtedly profit-
oriented entities which formulate strategies 
and policies based on business opportunities 
and risk considerations. In their operations, 
they compete not only with their private 
counterparts, but also with other commercial 
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banks and cooperatives as nonbank 
institutions. Therefore, such relatively more 
technical regulations for state-owned rural 
banks provided by the local government 
result in restricted movements for the banks 
to take business opportunities and market 
potential. Those regulations often impede the 
bank boards to effectively determine business 
strategies and policies. Furthermore, 
compliance with such regulations often takes 
much time for boards to follow procedures 
before taking a business decision, even for 
such uncomplicated regular business matters 
as employee recruitment and purchasing of 
assets and inventory. As indicated by Barth et 
al (2004) that policies that rely on guidelines 
that force accurate information disclosure, 
empower private-sector corporate control of 
banks, and foster incentives for private agents 
to exert corporate control work best to 
promote bank development, performance and 
stability. It is also aligned with a conclusion 
of Pasiouras et al (2009) that restrictions on 
bank activities reduce cost efficiency. Hence, 
revoking some restrictive clauses of the 
regulations and allowing the boards to 
perform their duties independently and 
professionally is deemed to improve the 
banks performance.  
At practical level, such local 
government regulations often result in some 
problems to the state-owned rural banks to 
run their business and penetrate potential 
markets. To some extent, such regulations 
can be considered as counter-productive 
matters as boards of the state-owned rural 
banks cannot take actions and policies 
autonomously and professionally. Some 
evidences which describe practical 
implications of such regulations are: First, the 
appointment of supervisory board members 
often involves mayor who to some extent is 
prone to select those as his “representatives” 
at the banks either to open access to or 
accommodate his certain interests. In a worse 
case, the mayor tries to compel his will even 
though he realizes that the proposed 
candidates do not have experiences in 
banking industries as one of requirements 
clearly stipulated in the banking authority 
regulations. 
Second, it sometimes occurs that a 
supervisory board member of provincial 
representative does not have adequate time to 
evaluate bank performance reports, develop 
business discussions with the board of 
directors and carry out on-site monitoring. 
These situations often become an important 
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obstacle for some boards of directors to make 
strategic decisions and plans to improve their 
banks performance. Third, the organization 
structure including job descriptions of 
employees which is attached to and part of 
the local government regulation often does 
not suit those bank business scales and 
complexities, even though it is subject to the 
needs of the rural banks. So far, there are no 
significant changes or adjustments to the 
banks organization structure by taking 
business environment into account.  
Fourth, as previously mentioned, it 
takes time to fulfill the needs of employees. 
It is because boards must follow a relatively 
long process of procurements procedures 
which are stipulated in the local government. 
Otherwise, disobedience will be considered 
as misconduct by bank examiners. The 
process entails several phases of planning, 
notification, applications acceptance, 
selection, the appointment of probationary 
employees and the appointment of 
employees. Besides, the procurements should 
be carried out by a committee in which its 
members not only consists of the bank boards 
(board of directors and supervisory board), 
but also the owner representatives. In fact, the 
needs to recruit employees or fulfill vacant 
positions should be immediately 
accomplished to make possible for the banks 
to operate appropriately and take advantages 
from business opportunities. Moreover, a 
rather inevitable consequence of the 
recruitment process is that the local 
government administrators sometimes 
recommend their incapable or inexperienced 
relatives in the process. Such a condition 
often puts the bank boards in a difficult 
situation between upholding professionalism 
and independence, and accommodating local 
executive interests. The relatively same 
procedure is also applied to the procurement 
of fixed assets and inventory. 
Fifth, due to worker-related 
procedures in the local government 
regulations which require regular employee 
promotion (held twice a year) and salary 
increase, performance assessment and 
evaluation are a dilemma to implement. For 
example, although a marketer cannot achieve 
monthly or annual target of loan 
disbursement which contributes to poor 
performance of the bank, boards cannot 
postpone his regular salary increase more 
than two years. In a worse case, boards 
cannot either impose sanctions to or even 
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dismiss bad performed employees due to 
their status of administrators’ relatives.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Ownership types have long been 
considered to impact on firm performance. In 
this study, such a conclusion is also evident 
that ownership types affect rural banks 
performance. The effect emerges from the 
existence of corporate governance 
uniqueness of the rural banks. In this case, the 
uniqueness is obvious for state-owned rural 
banks, whereas privately-owned rural banks 
do not show the same issue. Based on 
MANOVA test, statistical results reveal that 
state-owned rural banks have poorer 
performance than their private counterparts 
with regard to ROA, OEOI and NPL ratios. 
Among the three ratios, NPL has a significant 
effect on the state-owned rural banks 
performance. The most important implication 
from the results is that local government 
regulations impede boards of state-owned 
rural banks to apply good corporate 
governance practices in taking business 
decisions and policies professionally, 
independently, effectively and effciently. 
Hence, local governments as the bank owners 
should consider to lessen or even remove 
some restrictive articles in the regulations, 
particularly clauses which are considered 
overly technical. Besides, allowing the banks 
to comply with banking authority regulations 
and their internal business policies is 
reckoned to improve their performance.  
This study has some limitations to 
explain a comprehensive phenomenon of 
rural bank corporate governance practices in 
their relation to performance. It only 
examines and provides results for the 
performance distinction through a different 
test with a particular emphasis on state-
owned rural banks. It seems that a theoritical 
model with a regression analysis can offer a 
more inclusive explanation to clarify this 
issue. Besides, further research can consider 
to examine the effect of the ownership types 
of privately-owned rural banks on their 
performance. It is because private rural banks 
are also considered to have different 
characteristics of their governance practices. 
Dispersed individual shareholders, 
concentrated shareholders (with one or more 
controlling shareholders), family 
shareholders, insider ownerships, or a 
combination among them are features 
regarded as conditions which influence 
ownership-performance relations.  
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